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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CTX FINANCIAL, a Utah
corporation,

:

Plaintiff and Appellee, :

Case No. 950027-CA

vs.

Priority No. 15

:

CAROLYN MURPHY, HARRY MURPHY, :
AAA JEWELERS & LOANS, MIKE
VARDAKIS, LeGRANDE L.
CHRISTENSEN,
Defendants, Appellees
and Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEES
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, District Court Judge

1

CTX Financial, Inc. and Mike Vardakis, appellees herein,
espectfully request that this Court affirm the determination of
he Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
residing, on such grounds as follow:

JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a(k) , Utah Code Annotated.

This case was transferred to the Court

f Appeals from the Supreme Court•

STATEMENT OP THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether there is evidence in the record to support the

inding of the trial court that Carolyn Murphy had an ownership
rterest in the piano, and therefore, the determination of the
rial court should be affirmed?

2.

Whether there is evidence in the record to support the

Lnding of the trial court that Carolyn Murphy had a legal right to
iwn the piano or otherwise use it as collateral for loans that she
stained, and therefore, to affirm the decision of the trial court?

THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The trial judge is considered to be in the best position to
jsess the credibility of the witnesses and to derive a sense of
Le proceeding as a whole. State

v. Pena,
2

869 P. 2d 932, 936 (Utah

1994) .

The appellate court is not in the same position to

determine factual disputes and it is because of this disadvantage
that the appellate court affords deference to the lower court.

Western Kane County Special
Co.,

Serv.

Dist.

No. 1 v. Jackson

Cattle

744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987).

Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court under the
clearly erroneous standard. For the Court of Appeals to find clear
error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the trial
court are not adequately supported by the record while resolving
all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the
determination of the trial court.
(Utah 1994) ; see also Wessel

State

v. Erickson

v.

Pena,

Landscaping

869 P.2d 932
Co., 711 P. 2d

250, 252 (Utah 1985).

On April 5, 1995, Judge Timothy R. Hanson filed a Memorandum
Decision indicating that Carolyn Murphy had an ownership interest
in the property.

R. 786.

The Decision was incorporated into

Findings of Fact that must be given deference. The trial court's
factual findings are supported by the record, including the
testimony from the witnesses and the exhibits offered during the
course of the trial.

3

STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE

30-2-9/ Utah Code Annotated,
amily expenses - Joint and several liability.
The expenses of the family and the education of the children
re chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife or of
ither of them, and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or
eparately. (1953)

30-2-1, Utah Code Annotated,
ife's rights in property - Liability for husband/s debts.
Real and personal estate of every female acquired before
arriage, and all property to which she may afterwards become
ntitled by purchase, gift, grant, inheritance, bequest or devise,
hall be and remain the estate and property of such female, and
hall not be liable for the debts, obligations or engagements of
er husband, and may be conveyed, devised or bequeathed by her as
f she were unmarried. (1953)

70A-2-403, Utah Code Annotated,
ower to transfer - Good faith purchase of goods - "Entrusting."
(1)
A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his
ransferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of
limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the
riterest purchased.
A person with voidable title has power to
ransfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When
Dods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the
archaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the
purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is
later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a 'cash
sale,' or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as
larcenous under the criminal law.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a factual determination of the trial
court whereby Carolyn Murphy was found to have an ownership
interest in a piano.

As a result of this factual finding, the

trial court determined that Carolyn could convey that interest, and
could subsequently sell the piano to a bona fide purchaser.

Course of Proceedings
1.

Appellee, CTX Financial, filed the Complaint to initiate

the above-referenced case on February 27, 1992. R. 2.

2.

An Answer and Cross Claim was filed by AAA Jewelers and

Mike Vardakis on March 16, 1992. R. 80.

3.

On May 21, 1992, a default judgment in favor of CTX was

entered against Carolyn Murphy.

4.

R. 164.

On November 9, 1992, Harry Murphy filed his Answer to the

Complaint.

R. 277.

1

An Addendum has not been compiled or included with this
Brief because it does not appear to be necessary to provide
documentation other than as provided within this Brief and/or by
Harry Murphy in his Brief of Appellant.
5

5.

Harry Murphy filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May

4, 1992.

6.

R. 320.

On August 24, 1993, Carolyn Murphy filed a petition for

elief under chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, with
he United

States Bankruptcy

Court

for the District

of Utah,

entral Division, thereby making applicable the automatic stay
gainst creditor action.

7.

R. 839.

On November 12, 1993, Judge Timothy R. Hanson denied the

Dtion for Summary Judgment filed by Harry Murphy because of the
Kistence of genuine and material issues of fact regarding the
tfnership of the piano.

8.

R. 711.

On March 7-8, 1994, a trial was held before the Honorable

Lmothy R. Hanson, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for
lit Lake County, State of Utah.

9.

R. 779.

Mike Vardakis and CTX agreed to settle their individual

Laims and to pursue their claims against Harry Murphy in a joint
inner.

R. 779.

10.
imorandum

On April 5, 1995, Judge Timothy R. Hanson entered the
Decision

of the trial court wherein he ruled

Lrolyn Murphy had an ownership interest in the property.
6

that

R. 786.

11.

On June 22, 1994, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law and Judgment were filed with the trial court.

12.

R. 837.

Harry Murphy, however, filed a Motion to Amend the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment.

13.

R. 855.

On September 29, 1994, the trial court denied the Motion

to Amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment.
R. 900.

STATEMENT OP FACTS
1.

Carolyn Murphy ("Carolyn") and Harry Murphy ("Harry")

married in the year 1955. R. 990, 1034.

2.

Harry

and Carolyn

lived

as husband

and wife for

approximately thirty-six (36) years. R. 990, 1034.

3.

During their marriage, Harry and Carolyn raised .children

who play the piano.

4.

R. 994.

While married, Carolyn played the piano and gave piano

lessons to other children.

5.

R. 994-5, 1020.

Finally, during most of their marriage, Harry worked

outside the home and provided for the financial needs and desires
7

f the family, including the purchase of furniture, entertainment,
nd

other

like

items, while

Carolyn

worked

within

aintaining the home and the couple's children.

the home,

R. 996, 1021-21,

043-52.

6.

In about 1965, Harry and Carolyn purchased a piano, a

ason and Hamblin "BB" piano (the

7.

,f

B piano").

R. 990, 1038.

Harry found the piano and paid for it from funds that he

arned during his employment, which, at the time, were the only
ands available to the family household.

R. 990-91, 996, 1018-20,

038.

8.

While Harry and Carolyn had the B piano in their home,

arolyn and the children played the instrument; Harry did not
scause he does not play the piano.

9.

R. 994.

Harry stated that the main purpose for buying the B piano

is his resulting ability to "further development of my children's
isic ability."

10.

R. 1038-39.

Also, Carolyn gave lessons on the piano and earned some

>ney for the household through this activity.

Carolyn did not pay

m t for the use of the piano and did not pay a portion of the

8

money to Harry.

Furthermore, she did not ask Harry if she could

use the piano personally or commercially.

R. 994-95, 1020, 1040.

11.

Carolyn and Harry maintained the piano.

12.

In about 1969, Carolyn received a gift - another piano,

referred to as the A piano.

13.

She began part time employment in the late 1960fs

or early 1970's.

14.

R. 1017.

Carolyn was not working outside the home when the B piano

was purchased.

1970 f s.

R. 995-96.

She did not begin full time work until the late

R. 996, 1020.

Harry experienced some difficulty in employment in the

late 1980's and Carolyn began providing financial support for the
family.

15.

R. 1046, 1053-54.

In fact, Harry and Carolyn reached and complied with an

agreement whereby

Carolyn would pay the rent

for the

household and Harry would pay for the other expenses.

family

R. 1046,

1053-54.

16.

CTX Financial is a licensed pawn broker.

9

R. 950.

17.

On or about December

12, 1989, Carolyn came to CTX

inancial with the apparent intent of pawning certain items of
roperty.

The potential transaction was discussed with Carolyn,

he discussion included an explanation of the need for payments or
he resulting loss of the property that was pawned and the terms of
he agreements.

18.

R. 950-52.

On or about December 12, 1989, Carolyn signed a Purchase

greement whereby she pawned to CTX the B piano.

R. 951-52, 1075-

6, 1080.

19.

CTX paid Carolyn the sum of $4,000.00 for the B piano.

954, 1075.

20.

The

Purchase

Agreement

contains

the

following

epresentations and warranties by Carolyn:
For the sum of $4,000.00 paid to me, I do hereby sell to
CTX Financial, 2875 South Main #101, SLC Utah, the
property herein described, which I warrant and represent
to be my property free and clear of any liens or
encumbrances of any type or nature whatsoever. I further
agree that I will pay all costs and expenses incurred in
defending the title of said property.

I understand and agree that if I do not exercise my
option to repurchase said property within said period of
time, the Pianos purchased by CTX under this agreement
will be repossessed and that I will not make any claim
for the return of said property.
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I further understand and agree that the title to said
property shall pass free and clear of all encumbrances to
CTX FINANCIAL at the time of forfeiture of my rights to
repurchase said property.
R. 934-35, Tr. Exh. # 1.
21.

Pursuant

to

the

Purchase

Agreement,

the

right

to

repurchase absolutely terminated nine (9) months after the December
12, 1989 origination date.

22.

R. 934-35, 954-55, Tr. Exh. # 1.

In conjunction with the pawn of the B piano, Carolyn

executed a Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office Uniform Pawned &
Purchased Property Card ("pawn card").

R. 934-35, 951-53, 1071,

1076, Tr. Exh. # 1.

23.

The pawn card was

Sheriff's Office.

24.

filed with the Salt Lake County

R. 934-35, 952-53, 1076, Tr. Exh # 1.

With the execution of the pawn card, Carolyn did "certify

that the [B Piano] has not been obtained by any illegal means and
is my property and is free and clear of any encumbrances and I have
a legal right to sell it." R. 934-35, 946, 1075-76, Tr. Exh # 1.

25.
B piano.

CTX agreed to allow Carolyn to retain possession of the
Accordingly, in conjunction with the pawn, Carolyn

executed a UCC financing statement on the piano.
Tr. Exh. # 2 & 3.
11

R. 935-36, 953,

26.

The financing statement was filed with the State of Utah

n December 12, 1989. R. 935-36, Tr. Exh. 2 & 3.

27.

The December financing statement was amended to reflect

corrected social security number for Carolyn.

R. 935-36, Tr.

xh. 2 & 3.

28.

Finally, in conjunction with the pawn of the B piano,

arolyn executed a Bill of Sale representing as follows:
1 do sell . . . to CTX Financial . . . the following
described property, which I warrant and represent
ownership and good title to, the right to sell the same
and that there are no liens, encumbrances or charges
thereon, or against the same . . . .
Property Description:
2 mason & Hamblin Pianos #A24102 and #BB 25369

29.

On or about July 31, 1990, Carolyn entered into a new

irchase agreement with CTX whereby CTX paid the sum of $5,500.00
or the property sold to it through this new agreement.

R. 937,

>5, Tr. Exh. # 5.

30.

The property included in the July 31, 1990 Purchase

freement included the same B and A pianos and two paintings (1)
rans by Stevenson and (2) Arrangement of an Old Car by Edgar
ring.

R. 937, 955, Tr. Exh. # 5.
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31.

With the execution of the Purchase Agreement, Carolyn

made the same warranties that she had represented before, including
that she owned the property, it was free and clear of any liens or
encumbrances, and that she had the right to sell the property. R.
937, 955, Tr. Exh. # 5.

32.

On or about March 15, 1991, CTX loaned the sum of

$3,000.00 to Carolyn.

33.

R. 938, 957-60, Tr. Exh. # 9.

In conjunction with the loan, Carolyn did execute a

Promissory Note, Security Agreement and UCC Financing Agreement,
wherein the loan was secured by numerous collateral. R. 938, Tr.
Exh. # 9.

34.
time.

Carolyn pawned other property to CTX, during this same

R. 936-38, 955, Tr. Exh. # 4, 6 & 7.

35.

On all pawn transactions between Carolyn and CTX, to

repurchase the property, she was required to pay the principal
amount plus ten percent (10%) of that principal. R. 934, 954-55,
959, Tr. Exh. # 1 , 4, 5, 6, & 7 .

To renew the ability to

repurchase the property without repaying the principal, she was
required to pay an option renewal price of ten percent (10%) for
each of the months that she desired to renew the repurchase option.
R. 934, 954-55, 959, Tr. Exh. # 1, 4, 5, 6, & 7.
13

36.

On the March 1991 loan, the interest rate was at ten

ercent (10%) per month.

37.

R. 934, 959, Tr. Exh. # 9.

Carolyn was not able to repay the principal on the pawn

ransactions, however, she did not wish to lose the property.
anager

of CTX had

grown to

like Carolyn.

The

Consequently,

he

rranged for a business owned by his family to purchase the pawn
ransactions from CTX and to re-write the required payments so the
ffective interest rate was lowered from 120% per annum to 36% per
mum.

The paper work, thus, was assigned to Mutual Mortgage

srvices, Inc., the new financing company, however, Mutual retained
le ability to reverse the assignment upon any default by Carolyn.
938-39, 958-60, Tr. Exh. # 10.

38.

The Agreement between Carolyn and Mutual combined the

aounts due and owing under all of the pawn agreements, being a
)tal of $10,870.00, and took as collateral all property pawned
id/or given for the March loan.

39.

R. 938-39, 960, Tr. Exh. # 10.

The Promissory Note required payments of interest only

-om June 15, 1991, in the amount of $326.10 each month, until
>ril 15, 1992.
ipaid

balance

On May 15, 1992, Carolyn was required to pay the
of

$11,196.10

to

pay

the

pawn

debt

in

full.

Lrolyn, also, continued to be obligated to make the payments
squired by the March 1991 loan.
14

R. 938-39, Tr. Exh. # 10.

40.

With the exception of the March 15, 1991 Promissory Note

in the amount of $3,00.00, Tr. Exh. # 9, Carolyn obtained the money
from CTX during the time that she was responsible for paying, and
did pay, the family household rental expense, during 1989 and 1990.
R. 934-38, 950-56, 1046, 1053-54, Tr. Exh. # 1-7.

41.

Carolyn told Harry that she needed money for expenses

when she pawned the property to CTX.

42.

R. 998.

In fact, the divorce complaint filed by Harry states that

Carolyn had income of approximately $400.00 each month and that
Harry had been unemployed since December 1989. % 7, Complaint; R.
941, Tr. Exh. # 23. Further, the Complaint states that Harry knows
that Carolyn was attempting to sell marital property.

% 10,

Complaint; R. 941, Tr. Exh. # 23.

43.

Carolyn defaulted on the payments owed to Mutual.

R.

939, 961, Tr. Exh. # 11.

44.

Since Carolyn defaulted, CTX was required to take back

the debt from Mutual Mortgages and was required to initiate the
present law suit.

45.

R. 939, 960, Tr.Exh. # 11 & 12.

CTX obtained a default judgment against Carolyn and

LeGrande Christensen. Mr. Christensen was involved in this matter
15

ecause he took possession of the A piano and asserted that he
wned the same after being given notice that the piano had been
awned to CTX.

46.

R. 940, 969, Tr. Exh. # 20. 2

Carolyn

signed

other

tfnership of the B piano.

documents

wherein

she

asserted

These include a bill of sale to Mike

ardakis wherein she sold him the B piano, stating that "there are
o liens or encumbrances on piano #BB25369."

R. 940, 961-62,

071-72, Tr. Exh. # 21.

47.

When Carolyn sold the piano to Mike Vardakis, in addition

3 writing and signing the bill of sale, she told him that she
tfned the piano and could sell the same to him.

Further, she

slivered the piano to the home of Mr. Vardakis1 father-in-law. R.
10, 986-87, Tr. Exh. # 21.

48.

When Mr. Vardakis purchased the piano from Carolyn, he

is informed that she had the right to sell the same and had no
>ason to believe otherwise.

49.

See

R. 988.

Mr. Vardakis has paid the sum of $14,000.00 for the B

.ano, plus costs and attorneys fees.
2

R. 987.

Harry, also, claimed an ownership interest in the A piano,
> the extent that he negotiated a sale of the A piano, he picked
> the check for the A piano, he sold the piano and signed a
tlease of interest on the A piano. Tr. 999-1001.
16

50.

In about August 1990, Harry filed a Complaint for a

divorce from Carolyn.

51.

R. 991-92, 1037.

Harry and Carolyn both moved from the marital residence

in approximately September 1990. R. 992, 1037.

52.

Carolyn remained in possession of the B piano, even

though each party had been required to move to a different
residence.

53.

R. 1037-38.

Both Carolyn and Harry claimed ownership of the B piano

in the divorce proceedings.

54.

R. 941, Tr. Exh. # 23.

During the divorce case, Harry signed and filed a

financial declaration that stated
The attached Schedule A itemizes the joint debts of which
plaintiff is aware. . . . The enclosed Schedule B
inventories the property in the possession of the
parties, allocates values to each of them, and indicates
to whom the item belongs. . . . Many items held by the
defendant and plaintiff actually belong to their
children, Diana, Steve and David. Those items would be
delivered to them directly.
The items marked under
Harry's name would be given to him and those under
Carolyn's name would be given to her.
The items
identified under their joint names would be sold to
retire the outstanding debts. The items remaining could
be divided between them.
R. 941, 1059, Tr. Exh. # 23.

17

55 • On the financial declaration signed by Harry and filed
ith the Court, Harry listed the B piano under the joint names of
arry and Carolyn.

56.

R. 1060, Tr. Exh. # 23.

Although the parties eventually settled the divorce

atter and agreed that Harry could have the piano, this settlement
ccurred after Harry knew that Carolyn had pawned the B piano and
ad sold the piano to Vardakis.

57.

R. 992-94.

When Carolyn did not pay the obligation owed to CTX, it

as forced to commence collection action. Harry, then, claimed an
wnership interest in the B piano.

Thus, the resulting lawsuit.

. 961-63, Tr. Exh. # 11, 12 & 13.

58.

After commencing this action, Carolyn claimed that some

f the other property that was pawned to CTX belonged to Diana, one
f the daughters of Harry and Carolyn.
laim.

Harry, also, made this

Yet, at the trial, Harry testified that most of the

arniture items, being numerous and mostly antique, were purchased
tiile Diana was a child and had not been taken with Diana when she
oved from her parent's household.

59.

During

R. 1047-52.

these proceedings, Carolyn

filed

answers to

titerrogatories wherein she stated that she had not made any
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misrepresentations of fact concerning the ownership of the piano.
R. 942, 1077-78, Tr. Exh. # 27.

60.

During the course of the trial, Carolyn had attempted to

change her representation regarding ownership of the property and
alleged that she now understood that she did not own the B piano,
that Harry owned the piano, and that she had no right to sell the
piano or to use it as collateral. R. 1063, 1070, 1074, 1078, 1079.

61.

Carolyn testified that she signed the documents making

representations of ownership of the B piano, and that she signed
the pawn cards stating that she owned the piano free and clear
knowing that the pawn cards were to be filed "with the state". R.
1074-76.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Carolyn and Harry purchased a piano during their marriage

with marital property. They treated the piano as marital property
until the resolution of their divorce, which occurred approximately
twenty-six years after they purchased the piano. The ownership of
the piano was

contested

in the divorce proceeding.

In the

meantime, Carolyn pawned the piano, and subsequently sold the piano
to a bona fide purchaser for value, who did not have notice of any
other claim to the piano. The trial court determined, as a matter
of fact, that Carolyn had an interest in the piano and that
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etermination

is

entitled

to

deference

by

this

Court.

Such

inding, therefore, should be affirmed.

2.

Carolyn owned an interest in the piano. As a consequence

f that ownership interest, she was able to pawn her interest in
he piano.

In addition, although her title may have been in

onjunction with that of Harry, Carolyn could sell the piano to
ardakis, who was a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice
f any other claim to the piano.

The trial court found the facts

upporting the ownership interest, the transfers, the receipt of
alue by Carolyn and the bona fide position of Vardakis.

If Harry

as any remaining claim, it must be asserted against Carolyn.

The

onclusion of the trial court should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT I
THE COURT FOUND AS A MATTER OP FACT THAT THE PIANO WAS JOINT
MARITAL PROPERTY. THIS FINDING IS SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE AND MUST BE AFFIRMED
The trial court, Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, ruled
lat the B piano was marital property owned jointly by Carolyn and
irry at the time of the transactions involving CTX Financial and
Ike Vardakis.

This determination arose as a finding of fact from

LI of the evidence presented to the court.

As a finding of fact

ide by the trial court, it must be affirmed if it is supported by
ly evidence in the record.

State

v.

Pena,

869 P.2d 932 (Utah

)94) . Clearly, CTX and Vardakis are entitled to have any disputed
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evidence reviewed in the light most favorable to the determination
of the trial court.

Id.

Even without this weighty standard of

review, Harry would lose on this issue because the evidence
preponderates against his argument and in favor of the ruling of
the trial court.

Further, to successfully challenge the findings of fact made
by the trial court, "an appellant must marshal the evidence in
support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as
to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them
clearly erroneous."
1994) ; Trolley

Wade v. Stangl,

Square Associates

859 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App.

v. Nielson,

886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah

App. 1994).

In the instant case, Harry has failed to adequately marshal
the evidence. Harry states that Carolyn did not claim the B piano
in the divorce action.
the B piano

Carolyn, however, did claim ownership of

in the divorce proceedings.

On the financial

declaration signed by Harry and filed with the Court, Harry listed
the B piano under the joint names of Harry and Carolyn. Although
the parties eventually settled the divorce matter and agreed that
Harry could have the piano, this settlement occurred after Harry
knew that Carolyn had pawned the B piano and had sold the piano to
Vardakis.

The divorce Complaint filed by Harry demonstrates
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'.arry's knowledge that Carolyn was attempting to sell marital
roperty.

In addition, Harry testified that although he was

equesting only thirteen items, including the B piano, he could not
btain a settlement for the year prior to resolution of the divorce
ase, which agreement was obtained only after Harry knew about
arolyn's use of the piano.

Additionally, Harry did not refer the Court of Appeals to any
f the documents that Carolyn signed wherein she confirmed her
wnership of the B piano.

Also, Harry did not include Carolyn's

nswers to interrogatories wherein she stated that she had not made
ny misrepresentations of fact concerning the ownership of the
iano. Harry made no attempt to marshal the evidence that supports
tie findings and conclusions made by the trial court in this case,
nstead, Harry presented the evidence in the light most favorable
D his case.

Consequently, his appeal should be dismissed due to

Is failure to comply with the requirement that he marshall the
/idence and demonstrate his right to a reversal based on the lack
f evidence supporting the determination of the trial court.

>int l; Finding No, 6 is supported by the evidence presented at
rial and should be affirmed.
The piano was marital property at the time that Carolyn
rtained money for the property from CTX and Vardakis. Finding of
Let No. 6 and Conclusions of Law Nos. 2 and 3 are supported by the
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evidence and the appeal of this finding asserted by Harry should be
denied. Mr. Murphy appears to have forgotten the actual evidence
presented to the trial court in support of the finding and
conclusion that the piano was marital property.

That evidence

included the following:
a.

The piano was purchased for family use;

b.

The children played the piano;

c.

Carolyn played the piano;

d.

Harry did not play the piano;

e.

The piano was purchased when Harry was providing the

financial support for the family and Carolyn was maintaining
the household and children;
f.

Harry and Carolyn testified that each participated

in the maintenance of the piano;
g.

Carolyn gave piano lessons using the piano;

h.

Carolyn did not pay Harry for the commercial use of

the piano;
i.

Harry did not think it was necessary for Carolyn to

pay him for the use of the piano or for Carolyn to ask his
permission to use/play the piano;
j.

Harry testified that when Carolyn received the money

from CTX Financial, she was paying family and household
expenses, including the rent;
k.

Harry listed the piano as being joint marital

property when he prepared and filed with the court his
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Financial Declaration and Settlement Proposal in his divorce
action with Carolyn;
1.

Harry was awarded the piano in the divorce decree

only after he knew that Carolyn had pawned the piano to CTX.

Harry argues in his brief, pp. 14-15, that there was no
vidence of the use of the funds received by Carolyn for family
xpenses.

This assertion simply contravenes the entire weight of

he evidence.

Harry testified that Carolyn paid the rent for the

amily household

in the years 1989 and

1990.

Further, his

omplaint filed in the divorce proceeding states that he was
nemployed and that Carolyn had an income of only $400.00 each
onth. This is the time period in which Carolyn received the funds
rom CTX.

Contrary to the assertions of Harry, Mr. Wright did not
sstify that Carolyn told Mr. Wright that she used the money for
*r book business.

Mr. Wright stated that Carolyn said that she

sed the proceeds from the last $3,000.00 loan for the book
isiness, not the entire funds obtained by her previously, which
re the substantial part of the moneys due and owing by Carolyn to
PX.

Further, Harry asserts that the couple was separated at the
.me Carolyn received these funds. This simply is not true. Harry
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and Carolyn separated approximately September 1990, after the
majority of the funds had been given to Carolyn by CTX. The first
pawn transaction was completed in December 1989.

The last pawn

transaction involving the B piano occurred in July 1990. Again,
this transaction was prior to the separation of the parties. In
addition, Harry forgets that he and Carolyn continued to reside
together on an on-again, off-again basis and were living together
at the time of the trial in this matter.

Section 30-2-9, Utah Code Annotated,

Tr. 990.

provides that M[t]he

expenses of the family and the education of the children are
chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife or either of
them, and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or
separately." The only evidence on the use of the proceeds received
by Carolyn during 1989 and 1990, is that she had the responsibility
to pay the rent on the family household and that she did pay this
rent.

Consequently, the B piano could be assessed with the debt

owed to CTX.

Finally, the B piano was purchased with joint marital funds.
The evidence clearly demonstrates that at the time the piano was
purchased, Harry provided the sole financial support for the
family.

Carolyn raised the children and maintained the family

home. Harry purchased all of the furniture and other items in the
household at that time. Consequently, the fact that Harry paid for
25

.he piano out of his checking account is meaningless as to the
ownership of the property.

Property that is purchased during a marriage is presumed to be
tarital property.

"This marital property encompasses all of the

.ssets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained
nd from whatever source derived".
07 6, 1079 (Utah

1988).

Gardner

v. Gardner,

748 P.2d

Further, "marital property is ordinarily

11 property acquired during marriage and it 'encompasses all of
he assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever
btained and from whatever source derived1."
.2d 1314, 1317

(Ct. App. Utah 1990).

Dunn v. Dunn,

802

It is true, as Harry

sserts, that Utah law allows spouses to own property separately,
ee § 30-2-1, Utah Code Ann.

This statute is applicable, however,

nly if the parties did own the property separately.

In the present case, Harry and Carolyn jointly owned the B
iano.

As stated above, the facts in the record support this

inding by the trial court. Further, even Harry demonstrated that
ach spouse made a claim to the piano during the divorce. Harry,
imself, listed the B piano in his financial declaration as being
oint marital property.

As between Harry and Carolyn, Harry did

ot have a sole legal right to the B piano until August 1991, when
tie parties entered into the stipulation to resolve the issues in
tieir divorce.

This agreement between Carolyn and Harry was made
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after Harry knew that Carolyn had sold the piano and it was after
all of the transactions between Carolyn and CTX, and between
Carolyn and Vardakis.

Finding of Fact No. 6 is supported by the great weight of the
evidence in the record. The finding of the trial court should be
affirmed.

Point 2: Finding of Fact No. 14 is supported by the evidence in
the record and, therefore. should be affirmed.
Finding of Fact No. 14 is accurate.
that he alone maintained the piano.

Harry did not testify

He specifically stated that

both he and Carolyn caused the maintenance to be performed.

Point 3:

Findings of Fact Nos. 17-19 and Conclusions of Law Nos.

2 and 3 should be affirmed by this Court.
Findings of Fact Nos. 17-19 and Conclusions of Law Nos. 2 and
3 should be affirmed by this Court. The evidence presented to this
Court

that

supports the

Findings

and

Conclusions

regarding

ownership of the piano includes that delineated in Point 1, above.
That evidence, in conjunction with the issue of credibility of
witnesses, was considered by the Court. The issue of ownership has
been determined by the Court on the basis of that evidence, in
combination with consideration of the law.

Neither the Court's

decision, nor the Findings and Conclusions, hold that a married
person cannot own property separately.
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In the present case,

Lowever, the only evidence that supported Harry's contention of
;ole ownership was his testimony and that incredible testimony of
:arolyn.

This evidence was contradicted by Harry's own testimony

md the various statements made by Carolyn.

All other evidence

supports the Findings and Conclusions of the Court.

Accordingly,

10 changes should be made to Findings of Fact Nos. 17-19 or
inclusions of Law Nos. 2 and 3.

Harry continues to argue that because he wrote the checks for
he piano, and because both he and Carolyn asserted at the trial in
he present case that the piano belonged to Harry, that the
wnership issue was determined against the weight of the evidence.
arry misrepresents the state of the evidence contravening his
ssertion, and thus, attempts to mislead this Court in his attempts
o obtain a reversal of the findings of fact entered by the trial
ourt.

The trial court determined that Carolyn had an ownership

nterest in the piano based on the preponderance of the evidence.
arry previously had prepared, signed and filed with the court a
inancial declaration stating that the piano was joint marital
roperty. Harry testified that he attempted to obtain a settlement
ith Carolyn, in the divorce case, wherein he would be awarded the
iano for an entire year and that she would not agree.

Tr. 993.

bviously, Carolyn did not agree then that Harry solely owned the
piano.
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In fact, contrary to Harry's assertions, Carolyn did not
clearly testify at the trial that Harry always had owned the piano.
Carolyn testified that she had signed numerous documents containing
representations of her ownership of the B piano.
Further,

she

admitted

that

she

had

prepared

Tr. 1074-75.
answers

to

interrogatories in the case at bar wherein she asserted that she
had not committed fraud or misrepresentation of fact when she
signed the Bill of Sale on the piano stating that she owned the
piano free and clear and was selling the same to Vardakis.

Tr.

1077, Tr. Exh. 27. When Harry's counsel specifically asked if she
had an ownership interest in the piano, Carolyn asserted her right
to the protections of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, and stated her fear of incrimination in answering
such question. She did not say that she did not own an interest in
the piano.

Carolyn may feel guilty about selling the piano, she

may be in collusion with Harry with whom she did reside at the time
of trial, she may have a number of motives concerning her
testimony.

Carolyn's testimony concerning ownership lacks any

amount of credibility.

The trial court determined that her

testimony lacked credibility and that the weight of the evidence
substantiated her ownership interest in the piano. This finding of
fact is supported by the evidence in the record. The determination
of the trial court should be affirmed.
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oint 4: Finding No. 20 is supported by the evidence presented to
he trial court and should be affirmed.
Finding No. 2 0 should be affirmed by this Court.

Harry

ompletely ignores the actual evidence and the considerations of
he Court in regard to the Financial Declaration and Settlement
roposal.

Therein, Harry specifically listed the piano as joint

arital property.
old.

He did not simply list property that could be

Harry did attempt to explain the inconsistency between his

osition regarding ownership of the piano during the divorce
roceeding and the case at bar. His explanation was that the piano
as listed as joint marital property because he wanted to sell the
iano and pay off the substantial debt.

Harry, however, also

sserted that most of the debt had been created by Carolyn.

The trial court was not required to accept the explanation
rovided by Harry.

The court was entitled to, and did, consider

11 of the evidence in conjunction with the express listing by
arry of the piano as joint marital property.

Finding of Fact No.

D and Conclusions of Law Nos. 2 and 3 should be affirmed by this
Durt because they are supported by the evidence in the record.

sint 5: Finding No. 21 should be affirmed by this Court because
b is supported by the evidence presented to the trial court.
The trial court is considered to be in the best position to
ssess the credibility of the witnesses and to derive a sense of
le proceeding as a whole.

State
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v. Pena,

869 P.2d at 936.

The

appellate court is not in the same position to determine factual
disputes, and it is because of this disadvantage that the appellate
court affords deference to the lower court.

Western Kane

Special

Co.,

Serv.

Dist.

1377 (Utah 1987).

No. 1 v. Jackson

Cattle

County

744 P.2d 1376,

Great deference should be given to the trial

court's findings because they are based on an evaluation of
conflicting live testimony. Matter

of Estate

of Bartell,

lie

P. 2d

885, 886 (Utah 1989).

Judge Hanson heard the testimony of Carolyn, Harry, CTX and
Vardakis.

In addition, He reviewed all of the documentary

evidence, including the numerous documents signed by Carolyn. The
trial court evaluated the testimony, determined

the factual

disputes and found the findings based on the testimony and evidence
presented during the trial. The findings should not be disturbed
because Harry asserts that a portion of the evidence should be
given greater credibility than given by the trial court.

Certainly, the trial court was in an excellent position to
examine the credibility of all witnesses, including Carolyn, at the
time of trial. For good and obvious reasons, the Court reached the
conclusion that Carolyn's present representations as to ownership
of the piano were not believable, or at least, were not decisive of
the issue. Such present testimony certainly was in conflict with
other testimony as well as written and verbal representations
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oncerning ownership of the piano.

Finding of Fact No. 21 and

onclusions of Law Nos. 2 and 3 should be affirmed by this Court.

ARGUMENT II
CAROLYN HAD AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE PIANO, AND THEREFORE,
SHE COULD TRANSFER THAT INTEREST TO CTX AND/OR VARDAKIS
Finding No. 2 6 should be affirmed by this Court.

The trial

ourt found that Vardakis was a bona fide purchaser for value, and
hus, any claim in favor of Harry should be asserted against
arolyn. The facts support this finding and the law supports this
onclusion. There is no support for the allegations made by Harry.
he case law cited by Harry in support of his request for reversal
imply is not applicable to the present circumstances.
uthority pertains to a thief of property.

That

Carolyn was not a

tiief. She had an interest in the property. A bona fide purchaser
or value, without notice of any imperfection in the sale, does
eceive title to the property.

Harry, however, continues to have

claim against Carolyn for any injury that he can prove.

Of

Durse, if Carolyn utilized the proceeds received from Vardakis for
le support

of

the

family, Harry

may

not

have

any

injury

latsoever.

It is true that Harry could not be held personally

^sponsible for the debts incurred by Carolyn, unless they were for
imily expenses.

It is not true that Vardakis is not entitled to

*tain the use and possession of the piano.

As the trial court

:ated in the Memorandum Decision, "Mr Murphy's remedy as to the
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loss of his one-half interest as sold by his spouse to Vardakis is
a claim against Mrs. Murphy for having sold his interest in the "B"
piano, and apparently for violating the divorce court's restraining
order prohibiting Mrs. Murphy from selling property during the
pendency of the divorce proceeding."

The

weight

of

the

evidence,

and

the

applicable

law,

demonstrate that Carolyn had an ownership interest in the B piano,
she was not a thief, and she could convey or otherwise transfer her
interest therein.

In fact, in Whetom v.

Vesco,

Inc.3,

a case substantially

similar to the present case, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota
determined that the creditor was entitled to foreclose on the
entire property used as collateral prior to the divorce.
Whetom,
husband.

In

the former wife was sued by a creditor of her previous
In the prior divorce case, the only real marital asset

was stock ownership in a company.
3

Prior to the filing of the

The case of Whetom v. Vesco,
Inc. was referred to in
argument by counsel for CTX Financial, Inc. during the trial on
this matter.
Along with the reference in argument, counsel
provided to the Court the only copy of said case. The case is a
Court of Appeals of Minnesota case and the digests that would
include such a case are not available in the law libraries in the
State of Utah. Further, the trial court no longer has the copy of
the case. Counsel is attempting to obtain another copy of the case
from the University of Minnesota, however, the law library has been
closed. Counsel will provide an accurate citation and copy of the
case to the Utah Court of Appeals as soon as such case becomes
available.
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omplaint for divorce, the husband had pledged this stock to his
•usiness partner and had received a loan in consideration for the
•ledge of property. The creditor, the business partner, attempted
o foreclose on the stock after the divorce. The wife alleged that
he husband had committed a fraudulent conveyance on her marital
nterest in this stock.

The Court ruled that there is no vested

nterest during the marriage and that the fraudulent conveyance
laim would not be allowed.

The business partner was entitled to

oreclose on the stock because the husband had pledged the stock
rior to any issue of divorce.

In Utah, the only case similar to the present action is
learfield

State

Bank

v. Contos,

562 P.2d

622

(Utah

1977).

herein, the Utah Supreme Court found that the husband could convey
is one-half interest in marital property as collateral on a loan,
urther, the Court determined that the Bank held a lien only
gainst the husband's interest in the property and not against the
ife's interest.

Thus, in the present case, the trial court

orrectly ruled that Carolyn conveyed her marital interest in the
roperty to CTX.

In the present case, the trial court ruled that CTX would have
btained a fifty percent interest in the B piano because Harry
Duld have retained his one-half interest. This determination was
ade based on the finding that CTX had a duty to investigate the
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ownership

interest because the agent knew that Carolyn had

children.

Further, the trial court determined that CTX did not

make such an investigation. This latter determination was against
the only evidence on the subject, that being, that Mr. Wright had
gone to the home of Carolyn at 6:00 a.m., had looked at the B
piano, and that no one else was in the home at that time.

This

certainly demonstrated a basis for determining that Carolyn truly
had the ownership interest that she expressly represented in the
documents.

As to Vardakis1 entitlement to the piano, Clearfield
Bank,

State

562 P.2d 622, does not restrict Vardakis to a fifty-percent

interest in the piano. In Clearfield,

the Court specifically found

that the husband who had used the household goods as collateral did
expressly tell the bank that his wife jointly owned the goods and
would not sign on the loan.

The bank made the loan and accepted

the collateral with this explicit restriction concerning the
ownership of the collateral. Therefore, the bank had actual notice
of an adverse, prior claim to the household goods, and took its
interest subject to that claim.

In the present case, Judge Hanson determined that Vardakis was
entitled to the piano, not just a fifty-percent interest therein,
because Vardakis was a bona fide purchaser for value, without
notice of any other claim to the piano. Vardakis testified that he
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airchased the piano from Carolyn, had it delivered to the home of
.is

father-in-law

from

the

home

of

Carolyn,

and

that

she

epresented to him verbally and in writing that she owned the piano
ree and clear.

Further, he stated that he continued to own the

roperty and that he had paid a total of approximately $14,000.00
or the piano.

The trial court found that Vardakis had no notice

f any other possible claim to the piano.

There is no evidence in

he record that would contradict the finding of fact made by the
rial court that Vardakis was a bona fide purchaser for value and
ithout notice.

The evidence supports this finding and it should

e accepted by this Court.

Accordingly, Vardakis is a bona fide

urchaser for value, without notice of any adverse claim, and is
ntitled to an affirmance of the trial court's determination of his
ltimate ownership of the B piano.
nnotated,

Section 70A-2-403, Utah

provides, in pertinent part, that

Code

"[a] person with

oidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith
urchaser for value."

If Harry desires to pursue the alleged

rongful action of Carolyn in selling the piano to Vardakis, Harry
as a cause of action against Carolyn for any injury he suffered;
a does not have a right to the B piano.

CONCLUSION
The evidence in the record supports the findings made by the
rial court concerning the ownership interest of Carolyn in the
Lano.

Carolyn had a legal right to pawn the piano or otherwise
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use it as collateral for loans that she obtained. Vardakis, as a
bona fide purchaser for value and the assignee of the rights to the
piano of CTX, is entitled to the B piano. Consequently, deference
should be afforded to the findings of fact and the decision of the
trial court should be affirmed by this Court of Appeals.
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